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For companies legal privilege represents an essential bulwark against the state. In the case 
of internal investigations legal privilege is of prime importance to the companies. At crucial 
points of intersection the legal situation in the US differs from that of Germany. In the 
US, confidentiality is regarded with the aura of a Holy Grail, applying to in-house counsel 
and external lawyers alike. However, in Germany those privileges do not apply to in-house 
counsels and neither are they intended to apply to the corporate lawyer (so-called Syndikus). 
This is explained by Criminal Law policy arguments, which according to the author´s opin-
ion are not tenable. This essay represents solutions de lege lata and de lege ferenda, in order 
to at least include in-house lawyers (so-called Syndikus) within the scope of legal privilege. 




  This article is based on a presentation for the International Legal Ethics Conference VII: The Ethics & Regu-
lation of Lawyers Worldwide: Comparative and Interdisciplinary Perspectives in New York City from 14th – 
16th July 2016. 
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I. LIMITLESS CRIMINAL BUSINESS LAW AND THE REACTION OF BUSI-
NESSES 
 
A. Evolution of Criminal Business Law 
 
   In Western countries, Criminal Business Law has evolved with increasing momentum 
from an ameba into a dinosaur.2 Whereas in 1949 Edwin Sutherland still posed the ques-
tion as to whether deviant behavior in business is labeled as “crime” and falls under the 
jurisdiction of Criminal Law,3 today businesses and the crimes of powerful economic 
agents are at the focus of public investigations and the public interest.4 
 
The starting points for this are instances of re-criminalization and a stricter application of 
substantive Criminal Business Law.5   The latter affect all subsectors of the economy in 
the already highly-regulated markets.6  A general point of focus is the fight against cor-
ruption.  In Germany too, criminal liability loopholes are currently being closed7 and 
through implementation of an “overseas clause” the German legislator purports to be the 
	
		
2  White Collar Crime Act of 1949 (WiGBl. 1949, 193), Act Against the Restriction of Competition 1957 (BGBl. I 
1957, 2114), White Collar Crime Prevention Acts of 1976/1986 (First White Collar Crime Prevention Act of July 
29, 1976 (BGBl. I, 2034), Second White Collar Crime Prevention Act of May 15, 1986, (BGBl I, 721)), Securities 
Trading Act 1994 (BGBl. I 1994, 1759), Anti-Corruption Act of 1997 (BGBl. I 1997, 2038), Anti-Tax Evasion 
Act of 2001 (BGBl. I 2001, 3922). 
3  cf. Edwin H. Sutherland, Is White Collar Crime Crime? In: White Collar Crime, 29 ff. (Edwin H. Sutherland 
1949). 
4  The ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK also dealt with the subject in its 10 
years, cf. only: Matthias Jahn, Die verfassungskonforme Auslegung des § 97 Abs. 1 Nr. 3 StPO, ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK, 453 (2011); Carsten Momsen, Internal Investigations zwi-
schen arbeitsrechtlicher Mitwirkungspflicht und strafprozessualer Selbstbelastungsfreiheit, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK, 508 (2011); Frank Peter Schuster, Verwertbarkeit von Beweis-
mitteln bei grenzüberschreitender Strafverfolgung, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOG-
MATIK, 68 (2010); Hans Theile, Die Herausbildung normativer Orientierungsmuster für Internal Investigati-
ons – am Beispiel selbstbelastender Aussagen, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMA-
TIK, 378 (2013). 
5  Forerunner: Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX). cf. also the US Federal statutes “Mail Fraud Statute” (2012), 
“Wire Fraud Statue” (2012), and “Anti-Kickback Act” (2012), which also are for the purpose of battling cor-
ruption, for more details: Jeffrey Boles, Examining the lax treatment of commercial bribary in the united states: 
A prescription for reform, AMERICAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL, 119 (2014); as well as in general regarding 
expansion of US Criminal Business Law: Lucian E. Dervan, International White Collar Crime and the Glob-
alization of internal Investigations, FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL, 361, 363 f. (2011). Further Physician 
Payments Sunshine Act 2010, which contains prior offenses and provides for a duty of reporting to the relevant 
authorities with regard to donations of the pharmaceutical industry to Health Care Professionals which is sub-
ject to penalty upon violation. 
6  Parallel to this development, a hyphenation effect has formed, e.g. Employment-Criminal Law, Capital Mar-
kets-Criminal Law, Medical-Criminal Law (Business Criminal Law for the doctor), Anti-trust-Criminal Law, 
Pharmaceuticals-Criminal Law, Environmental-Criminal Law. 
7  Introduction of § 299a StGB, Reform of § 299 StGB, in detail: Hendrik Schneider, Sonderstrafrecht für Ärzte? 
Eine kritische Analyse der jüngsten Gesetzentwürfe zur Bestrafung der „Ärztekorruption“, ONLINEZEIT-
SCHRIFT FÜR HÖCHSTRICHTERLICHE RECHTSPRECHUNG ZUM STRAFRECHT, 473 (2013). 
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guardian of foreign competition orders.8  It is well known that the reach of US criminal 
law has been extended since the FCPA was passed in 1977.9 
 
The same applies to the introduction of the UK Bribery Act on July 1, 201110, whose “of-
fences” are so vague that the Ministry of Justice published guidelines for application of 
the law setting the perimeters of the new law for the businesses.11 
 
Parallel to this, the risks of detection for occupational and corporate crime12 have in-
creased. A key role in this context is played by whistleblowing, which was taken to the 
extreme through Sec. 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act13, but after having transcended initial 
resentment14 is also increasingly being applied in Germany as a measure to make crime 
more visible and as a bottom up instrument of sustainable compliance.15 
 
Ever since Enron and WorldCom in 2001 and 2002 and the subprime crisis in 200716 pub-
lic opinion, which is the forerunner and pacesetter (buzzword: “political-journalistic re-
inforcement cycle”17) of punitive criminal law policy in the area of Criminal Business Law, 
has changed. Introduction of the SOX in 2002 was accompanied by the words of then 
	
		
8  Günter Heine & Jörg Eisele, in Strafgesetzbuch, § 299 No. 29a StGB (Adolf Schönke & Horst Schröder 29th 
ed. 2015); Gerhard Dannecker, in Strafgesetzbuch Bd.3, § 299 StGB, No. 74 (Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann 
& Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen, 4th ed. 2013). 
9 Regarding the historical context of the FCPA, cf. Hendrik Schneider, in Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, § 3 No. 498 
(Hauke Brettel & Hendrik Schneider 1st ed. 2014), as well as in detail Hartmut Berghoff, From the Watergate 
Scandal to the Compliance Revolution: The Fight against Corporate Corruption in the United States and Ger-
many, BULLETIN OF THE GHI, 7 (2013); for a historical overview of the expansion of US Criminal Law see: 
Lucian E. Dervan, International White Collar Crime and the Globalization of internal Investigations, FORD-
HAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL, 361, 363 f. (2011). 
10  Jochen Deister & Anton Geier, Der UK Bribery Act 2010 und seine Auswirkungen auf deutsche Unternehmen, 
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT, 12 (2011). 
11  Jochen Deister & Anton Geier, Der UK Bribery Act 2010 und seine Auswirkungen auf deutsche Unternehmen, 
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT, 81 (2011). 
12  MARSHALL R. CLINARD & RICHARD QUINNEY, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR SYSTEMS: A TYPOLOGY, 130 ff. 
(1967). 
13  The entire text of Section 922 can be retrieved at https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/dodd-frank-sec-
922.; cf. also: Caitlin Hickey, Incentivizing Whistleblowing in the United States Qui Tam, Anti-Retaliation and 
Cash-For-Information, NEUE KRIMINALPOLITIK, 388 (2015). 
14  Exemplary here Thomas Lampert, in Corporate Compliance: Handbuch der Haftungsvermeidung im Unter-
nehmen, § 9 No. 35 (Christoph E. Hauschka et al. 2nd ed. 2010); Frank Maschmann, in Handbuch der Kor-
ruptionsprävention, 138 ff. No. 125 ff. (Dieter Dölling et al. 2007); regarding the status of the Rotsch debate, 
Criminal Compliance, § 2 Rn. 28 ff. (Thomas Rotsch 2015). 
15  ESTHER PITTROFF, WHISTLE-BLOWING-SYSTEME IN DEUTSCHEN UNTERNEHMEN EINE UNTERSUCHUNG 
ZUR WAHRNEHMUNG UND IMPLEMENTIERUNG (2011); HENDRIK SCHNEIDER & DIETER JOHN, DAS UN-
TERNEHMEN ALS OPFER VON WIRTSCHAFTSKRIMINALITÄT (2013).  
16  Regarding the analysis of international criminology against the backdrop of the subprime crisis, Hendrik 
Schneider, in Festschrift für Wolfgang Heinz 661, (Eric Hilgendorf & Rudolf Rengier 2012). 
17  Sebastian Scheerer, Der politisch publizistische Verstärkerkreislauf. Zur Beeinflussung der Massenmedien im 
Prozess strafrechtlicher Normgenese, KRIMINOLOGISCHES JOURNAL, 223 (1978). (Analysis of International 
Criminology Against the Backdrop of the Subprime Crisis). 
	
	
COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 3   NUMBER 1   2017 
HENDRIK SCHNEIDER | THE ENTERPRISE IN TESTUDO FORMATION 
 
PAGE  47 
President George W. Bush: “The era of low standards and false profits is over ... no board-
room in America is above or beyond the law... No more easy money for corporate crimi-
nals, just hard time.''18 These statements were backed by creation of a Corporate Fraud 
Task Force to step up the intensity of prosecution of white collar crime.19  
 
In Germany as well, there are predominant calls for stricter prosecution of white collar 
criminals and “tax evaders”. Criminal law experts, criminologists,20 practitioners, politi-
cians21 and other economic agents22 predominantly support this process. They participate 
in public discourse as moral entrepreneurs23. They demand strict measures,24 advocate the 
extensive interpretation of existing regulations on grounds of Criminal Law policy,25 
scandalize the violation of norms,26 demonize perpetrator legal entities27 and regard the 
	
		
18  Elisabeth Bumiller, Corporate Conduct: The President; Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud In Corporations; in: 
THE NEW YORK TIMES (July 31, 2002). 
19  cf.: Bruce A. Green & Ellen S. Podgor, Unregulated Internal Investigations: Achieving Fairness for Corporate 
Constituents, 54, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW, 73, 83 f. (2013). 
20  In this context Marxist-leaning approaches which attack the market economy as an economic system dominate 
(“greed-is-good mentality”; Predatory Society), cf. e.g PAUL BLUMBERG, THE PREDATORY SOCIETY. DECEP-
TION IN THE AMERICAN MARKETPLACE (1989); further James William Coleman, Toward an Integrated The-
ory of White-Collar Crime, 93, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 406 (1987); summary JAMES WILLIAM 
COLEMAN, THE CRIMINAL ELITE: UNDERSTANDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME, 193-233 (6th ed. 2006). 
21  cf. press release by the SPD party by Johannes Fechner (Member of Parliament), “Korruption im Gesund-
heitswesen beenden.” retrievable at: http://www.spdfraktion.de/presse/pressemitteilungen /korruption-im-
gesundheitswesen-beenden, as well as the website of the Member of Parliament Kathrin Vogler (Die Linke), 
retrievable at: http://www.kathrin-vogler.de/themen/gesundheit/korruption/details/zurueck/aerztekorrup-
tion/artikel/korruption-im-gesundheitswesen-die-krebsmafia/. 
22  e.g. Transparency International.  
23  HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE, 147 ff. (1966). 
24  Paradigmatic Thomas Fischer, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR MEDIZINSTRAFRECHT 1, 1 f. (2015): “Corruption in the 
healthcare system, in particular in the contract doctor system, must finally be made prosecutable and consist-
ently prosecuted.  Only after several dozen doctors and distributors have actually been sentenced and have 
been deprived of their careers will the message that gang-like corruption to the detriment of the public and its 
weakest members will not be tolerated.” And: “unscrupulous enrichment at the expense of society which sig-
nificantly defines the healthcare market “; see also: Cornelia Gaedigk, Kein Sonderrecht für Ärzte – ein Ein-
wurf aus Sicht der Ermittlungspraxis, 5, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR MEDIZINSTRAFRECHT, 268 (2015). 
25  e.g.: Oliver Pragal, Das Pharma-„Marketing” um die niedergelassenen Kassenärzte: „Beauftragtenbestechung” 
gemäß § 299 StGB!, 5, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT, 133 (2005); THOMAS FISCHER, STRAFGESETZ-
BUCH, § 299 No. 10e StGB (62th ed. 2015). 
26  In Germany hyphenated terminology has established itself in this context: Arzneimittel-Skandal, Or-
ganspendeskandal, Pflegeskandal or the name of the affected company is used, e.g. Ratiopharm-Skandal, cf..: 
DER SPIEGEL ONLINE, Ratiopharm-Skandal: "Das erschüttert den Glauben an den Rechtsstaat", in: 
http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/service/ratiopharm-skandal-das-erschuettert-den-glauben-an-den-
rechtsstaat-a-648892.html. (Ratiopharm Scandal: “Undermining Faith in the Rule of Law”). 
27  Pamela H. Bucy, Coporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75, MINNESOTA 
LAW REVIEW, 1095, 1157 (1991); a differentiated reconstruction of this approach can be found in Alschuler, who 
i.a. presents the view advocated by Beale (follows below), Albert W. Alschuler, Two ways to think about the 
punishment of corporation, 46, AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW, 1359, 1369 (2009): “The entity can be evil 
although the people who comprise it are mostly good. (...) the entity has not only an ethos, but a soul. The 
devils inside it must be exorcised despite the human cost”. 
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facts of a case as a criminal offense which has not yet been solved.28 In this spirit, the judges 
increasingly gravitate towards incarceration of “corporate criminals” and toward imposi-
tion of Draconian company penalties, 29 where the respective legal system provides for 
such an instrument or an equivalent (economic “forfeiture” in German Criminal Business 
Law30).31 
 
B. The Defense Strategy of the Businesses- the Significance of Internal Investi-
gations in Punitive Criminal Business Law 
 
The depicted development naturally did not pass over the businesses without any impact. 
Investigation proceedings against the competitors are perceived as a “ticking time 
bomb”.32  It is expedient to prepare for investigations, to have an effective defense. In 
short: Businesses all over the world have set themselves up in a testudo formation in an 
attempt to effectively defend themselves from the attacker in the shape of a strong state 
and its investigation authorities (similar to the well trained Roman legionnaires when us-
ing the “scutum”). The name of the ever-so ponderous bulwark is Compliance and has at 
least the latent function33 of shielding the business from government encroachment, pre-
venting corporate misconduct from the start or at least making it internally visible and 




28  cf. the reports in the media on the DRK clinic scandal, cf.: “DRK-Skandal So lief die Abzocke”, (DRK Scandal: 
This Is How the Rip-Off Happened) retrievable at: http://www.berliner-kurier.de/berlin/polizei-und-jus-
tiz/drk-skandal-so-lief-die-abzocke-4543444. 
29  For example, the British pharmaceutical company GSK in China was fined 491 million dollars in China, cf.: 
Thomas Fox, GSK in China: A New Dawn in the International Fight Against Corruption, 1, COMPLIANCE 
ELLIANCE JOURNAL 29, 41 (Vol. 1 No. 1 2015), retrievable at: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-
qucosa-176485; the CEO of Worldcom Bernie Ebbers was sentenced to 25 years of incarceration at age 63 on 
grounds of accounting fraud, see http://www.capital.de/themen/der-worldcom-skandal.html (retrieved on 
March 16, 2016).    
30  Hans Theile, Die Herausbildung normativer Orientierungsmuster für Internal Investigations – am Beispiel 
selbstbelastender Aussagen, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK, 378, 379 (2013) 
referring to qualitative Interviews: “Nowadays there are ‘hitlists’ regarding which prosecuting attorney can 
show the greatest adsorption volume. This is a mindset that was totally irrelevant when I [...] started out with 
legal defense. Looking at it this way [...] prosecuting attorneys have now also become business enterprises”.  
31  In detail Hendrik Schneider, in: Matthias Jahn & Charlotte Schmitt-Leonardy & Christian Schoop (publ.), 
DAS UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT UND SEINE ALTERNATIVEN, 25 (2016) 
32  cf. Burkhard Boemke et. al, Evidenzbasierte Kriminalprävention im Unternehmen. Wirksamkeit von Compli-
ance-Maßnahmen in der deutschen Wirtschaft –  Ein empirisches Forschungsvorhaben,  9, DENKSTRÖME, 
79 (2012); Hendrik Schneider & Kevin Grau & Kristin Kißling, „Der Schock von Berlin saß tief!” Ergebnisse 
eines empirischen Forschungsvorhabens zu Compliance im Gesundheitswesen und der Pharmaindustrie, COR-
PORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT, 48 (2013).  
33  In detail: KRISTIN KIßLING, DIE LATENTE FUNKTION VON COMPLIANCE. (2016); Michele DeStefano, The 
Chief Compliance Officer - Should there be a new “C” in the C-Suite?, THE PRACTICE (July 2016), retrievable 
at: https://thepractice.law.harvard.edu/article/the-chief-compliance-officer/.  
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One key means of the repressive arm of Compliance 34 are “internal investigations”.35 
These are investigations carried out by the business or by a hired agent in the case of sus-
picion of breaches of the law or other legal violations.36 
 
The function of the internal investigations varies depending on the question of whether 
the facts to be determined are already the subject of government investigation proceed-
ings. In the case of ongoing investigation proceedings, searches (still legal in compliance 
with the rule of reasonableness37) may be prevented by the internal investigations.38 Evi-
dence may be provided to the authorities under supervision. In this way, a certain degree 
of control by the business is retained in the proceedings. Moreover, the (customary) pub-
lic guarantee of extensive internal solution of the case39 is a means of limiting reputation 
damage and diverting the accusation from the delinquent corporate structure to the indi-
vidual criminal employee, i.e. from a failure of the system to an individual transgression. 
Outside of government investigation proceedings, internal investigations provide the op-
portunity of detecting incriminating conduct and subjecting it to the judgment of an en-
trepreneurial decision (to continue or to modify the business activity that has been 
acknowledged or is regarded as relevant in Criminal Law?). It is part of risk screening and 
risk management and prepares internal sanctions against the perpetrators. Internal inves-
tigations provide the freedom to make a decision as to whether and in what way (criminal 
prosecution or “only” an Employment Law measure) to react to a detected violation.40 
Where instated immediately in the case of existing grounds of suspicion, the business is 
prepared if government proceedings should be taken. Moreover, an external or internal 
	
		
34 Folker Bittmann, Internal Investigations Under German Law, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 74, 77 
(Vol. 1 No. 1 2015), retrievable at: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-176443; Hans Theile, Die 
Herausbildung normativer Orientierungsmuster für Internal Investigations –  am Beispiel selbstbelastender 
Aussagen, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK, 378, 384 (2013). 
35  The emergence of Internal Investigations was backed differently by academia and practice in Germany and the 
US, in Germany the attitude toward internal investigations tended to be suspicious and unfavorable: clear 
skepticism at Gina Greve, Privatisierung behördlicher Ermittlungen, STRAFVERTEIDIGER FORUM, 89 (2013) 
with further references; in contrast, the attitude in the US was embracive from the start: cf. Lucian E. Dervan, 
International White Collar Crime and the Globalization of internal Investigations, FORDHAM URBAN LAW 
JOURNAL, 361, 364 (2011), with reference to relevant case law.  
36  cf. JOSEPHINE SCHARNBERG, ILLEGALE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS, 27 (2015); cf. also Sascha Süße & Car-
olin Püschel, Collecting Evidence in Internal Investigations in the Light of Parallel Criminal Proceedings, COM-
PLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 26, 29 f. (Vol. 2 No. 1 2016), retrievable at http://nbn-resolv-
ing.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-199168; showing the initial situation upon instatement of an Internal Inves-
tigation: Bruce A. Green & Ellen S. Podgor, Unregulated Internal Investigations: Achieving Fairness for Cor-
porate Constituents, 54, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW, 73 (2013). 
37 Folker Bittmann, Internal Investigations Under German Law, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 74, 87 
(Vol. 1 No. 1 2015), retrievable at: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-176443. 
38 Sascha Süße & Carolin Püschel, Collecting Evidence in Internal Investigations in the Light of Parallel Criminal 
Proceedings, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 26, 34 (Vol. 2 No. 1 2016), retrievable at: http://nbn-resolv-
ing.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-199168. 
39  Klaus Moosmayer, in Interne Untersuchungen, 3 (Klaus Moosmayer & Niels Hartwig 2012).  
40  cf. Sascha Süße & Carolin Püschel, Collecting Evidence in Internal Investigations in the Light of Parallel Crim-
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whistleblower is likely to refrain from criminal prosecution if he recognizes that the com-
pany has already adequately responded to the offense reported by him. 
II. THE ROLE OF THE IN-HOUSE COUNSEL - GERMAN AND INTERNA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
A. Involvement of the in-house counsel in internal investigations 
 
   In-house counsels, who are frequently corporate lawyers, are directly involved in inter-
nal investigations. Klaus Moosmayer, Chief Counsel Compliance of Siemens AG, sum-
marizes it as follows: 
 
“Either a corporate lawyer with the relevant expertise or an external lawyer hired for the 
purpose may participate as a representative of the company in the investigations. It must 
be taken into account here that even where an external law firm is hired for the internal 
investigations the function of coordinator is always required within the company, which 
is normally performed by a lawyer from the internal Legal and/or Compliance depart-
ment. Without this “project office”, investigations performed by external professionals in 
the company will hardly be able to be performed within an acceptable period and at rea-
sonable costs.” 41 
 
Nothing could be truer. The fact that internal investigations have developed into a lucra-
tive market for external providers is not to be underestimated. The problem of the limits 
on internal investigations exists in particular where the company promised to solve the 
case completely, as is often the case. External providers of “forensic services” take ad-
vantage of this and conclude their reports with a statement that further investigation of 
the case is necessary, not only to avoid liability risks. Moreover, the external specialists are 
often not lawyers but former police officers, economists or IT specialists. They need to 
submit the investigations to legal guidance with regard to the applicable Criminal Law 
provisions to the facts of the case. Failing this, there is a risk that the investigations become 
trivial or extend to facts which have already lapsed under the statute of limitations. To 
this extent, in-house counsels fill an important interdisciplinary function. They coordi-
nate the work of external providers of relevant services, evaluate the results, draw legal 
conclusions from them and prevent unnecessary expenses (which may even be the basis 
of embezzlement accusations against the executive body having the investigations per-
formed). 
 
B. Significance of Legal Privilege 
 
1. Consequences for the practice of internal investigations 
 
Against this backdrop it is decisive for the work of the in-house counsels and the external 
	
		
41  Klaus Moosmayer, in Interne Untersuchungen, 3 (Klaus Moosmayer & Niels Hartwig 2012). 
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lawyers involved in the internal investigations whether they can trust that the information 
obtained by them and the documents prepared by them will remain confidential in the 
case of investigation proceedings. Extensive protection would be ensured if the legal priv-
ileges set out in the StPO (Criminal Proceedings Ordinance) (right to refuse to provide 
evidence, § 53 Sect. 1 Clause. 1, No. 3; prohibition of seizure, § 97 Sect. 1-3; surveillance 
prohibition, § 100c Sect. 6 and the restriction of investigation measures in accordance with 
§ 160c StPO) can be claimed.42  For US proceedings, they would have to be covered by the 
Attorney-Client Privilege or respectively the Work Product Doctrine would have to ap-
ply.43 If they can claim these privileges the defense strategy of the testudo takes the desired 
effect. The company has absolute control over the flow of information to the investiga-
tion authorities. The latter cannot gain anything from the internal investigation results 
without the consent of the company and may not resort to them. In the case of refused 
cooperation, prosecuting attorneys and police forces have to start from scratch; the key 
documents may be in the possession of the party subject to professional secrecy. 
 
If in contrast legal privilege is denied, the company loses the protection and the head of 
the internal investigations will find himself in hot water. On the one hand, he owes his 
company or employer secrecy and loyalty, on the other hand, as a witness, he is obligated 
to testify and must do so truthfully and completely; his documents may be seized in the 
process.44 
 
The conception of internal investigations, the question as to who heads them, who is in-
volved and who is not be involved, is thus decisively dependent on the extent of the legal 
privilege. According to the legal situation in Germany a distinction is to be made between 
(external) lawyers /defense counsels, in-house counsels and corporate lawyers. This dis-
tinction is unknown in the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition. Which model is preferable, which 
an atavism in the globalized economy? 
 
2. Substance and legitimation of legal privilege 
 
It can be stated in a somewhat simplified manner that legal privilege has a longer tradition 
than the in-house counsel profession. The corporate lawyer or “Syndikus” has an excep-
tional position in this context. In the Middle Ages this was regarded as a legal scholar in 
charge of the legal affairs of the towns or local authorities.45 It was not until World War I 
that companies switched to having internal corporate lawyers advise and represent them 
	
		
42  cf. see detailed Folker Bittmann, Internal Investigations Under German Law, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOUR-
NAL, 74, 92 ff. (Vol. 1 No. 1 2015), retrievable at: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-176443. 
43  Basics on Attorney-Client Privilege: Upjohn Co. v. United States 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); on Work Product 
Doctrine: Hickman v. Taylor 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). 
44  Rainer Griesbaum, in Karlsruher Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung, § 161a No. 4 StPO (Rolf Hannich 7th 
ed. 2013); cf. BVerfG: Recht des Zeugen auf einen Rechtsbeistand, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 103 
(1975).  
45  The term “Syndicus” is derived from the Greek “sýndikos” (advocate, attorney).  
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and resorted to external lawyers with less and less frequency.46 Contrary to the in-house 
counsel, the corporate lawyer is simultaneously admitted to the bar, a fact which cast 
doubts on his legal position if he is employed by the company he represents, ever since his 
emergence.47 The same was true of the terminology. Whereas up until 2016 the talk was 
either of Syndizi, Syndikusanwälte or Syndikus-Rechtsanwälte,48 i.e. a uniform terminol-
ogy was lacking, the legislator with the Act on the Reorganization of Corporate Counsel 
Law in 201649  introduced the uniform term “Syndikusrechtsanwalt“ (§ 46 II BRAO) 
(roughly: corporate lawyer).  According to the legal definition in § 46 Sect. 2 BRAO a 
corporate lawyer is an employee who practices as a lawyer (as defined by § 46 Sect. 3 
BRAO) for his employer who is not a lawyer, patent lawyer or legal firm or patent law 
firm. For his work, the corporate lawyer must be admitted to the bar pursuant to § 46a 
BRAO. 
 
In contrast, legal privilege originated in the 16th century in the Anglo-Saxon legal tradi-
tion50 and in Germany as a uniform provision for the right to refuse evidence for the de-
fendant’s legal defense counsel and public lawyers in the “Draft of a German Criminal 
Law Ordinance” of 1874: “ For the attorney-client relationship is always based on trust 
which is entitled to protection of the law and the law may not force the client to conceal 
specific facts because of the fear that their disclosure could lead to criminal prosecution”.51 
The right to refuse evidence for lawyers with regard to information disclosed to them 
during the exercise of their profession was finally set forth in § 52 No. 3 of the Criminal 
Procedural Ordinance of the German Empire (1877).  
 
Recognition of the right to refuse evidence or the Attorney-Client Privilege52 was not to 
be taken for granted. Only gradually did the attitude gain ground that confidentiality of 
communication between attorney and client is not only in the individual interest of the 
parties involved, but also in the interest of administration of justice in general and takes 
precedence over the possibilities of more extensive investigation of the case. In the Anglo-
	
		
46  cf.: Hans-Jürgen Hellwig, Der Syndikusanwalt – neue Denkansätze. Die systematische Ausgrenzung des Syn-
dikusanwalts seit 1934, 1, ANWALTSBLATT, 2 (2015). 
47  Claus Roxin, Das Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht des Syndikusanwalts, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 
1130 (1992). 
48  Cf. Gregor Thüsing & Johannes Fütterer, Der Syndikus und die Anwaltszulassung nach dem Referentenent-
wurf des BMJV – Sein oder Nichtsein? NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ARBEITSRECHT, 595, 596 (2015).  
49  BT-print. 18/5201. 
50  In his study Auburn refers to a dozen cases between 1570 and 1580 through which the Attorney-Client Privilege 
was established, cf. JONATHAN AUBURN, LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE: LAW AND THEORY, 2000. In 
detail: Goeffrey C. Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, CALIFORNIA LAW RE-
VIEW, 1061, 1070 (1978). 
51  CARL HAHN, DIE GESAMMTEN MATERIALIEN ZU DEN REICHS-JUSITZGESETZEN BD. 3, 106 f. (1880/1881). 
52  According to an established definition the Attorney-Client Privilege comprises the following legal position: 
“(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the 
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance per-
manently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.”, 
cf. JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMOR ON EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton, revised ed. 1961). 
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Saxon legal tradition this perspective, which reinforced and established the attorney-client 
privilege can be traced to a paradigm shift in the derivation of the privilege. The reason 
for the legal privilege was no longer the “gentleman approach” which traced the lawyer’s 
right to silence and to refuse evidence to “oath and honor of the attorney”53, but the no-
tion embedded in Utilitarianism that the proceedings must be in accordance with the rule 
of law and the corresponding general interest in a well-functioning practice of the legal 
profession.54 In Germany legal privilege is also an expression of the idea that the lawyer is 
a legal administration body.  In an essential ruling the German Supreme Court ex-
pounds55: 
 
“The protection of the practice of the legal profession against government control and 
patronization is not solely in the individual interest of the specific lawyer of the specific 
client. The lawyer is a 'legal administration body’ whose vocation is to represent the inter-
ests of his client. His professional work is in the public interest in effective legal admin-
istration in accordance with the principles of the rule of law. Under the principle of the 
rule of law set out in the Constitution, already on grounds of equal opportunity and pro-
cedural equality the citizens are entitled to a legal counsel who they can trust and who 
they can expect to represent their interests independently, freely and free of self-interest.  
As the appointed independent advisor and counsel it is incumbent on him to provide 
comprehensive support to his client. 
 
The prerequisite for fulfilling this task is a relationship of trust between the attorney and 
the client. Integrity and reliability of the individual member of the profession as well as 
the right and duty of confidentiality are basic conditions for the development of this trust. 
Hence, professional secrecy has always been one of the lawyer’s fundamental duties.” 
 
3. Extent of legal privilege 
 
It can be concluded from this that the lawyer as well as the defense counsel (§ 138 StPO) 
have a right to refuse evidence as bound to professional secrecy under German Criminal 
Law § 53 Sect. 1 Nr. 2, Nr. 3 StPO. Protection against circumvention is provided by the 
right to refuse evidence by paraprofessionals (§ 53a StPO), the seizure prohibition (§ 97 
StPO) and the prohibitions on the recording and evaluation of evidence set out in § 160a 
StPO (as from Jan. 1, 2008) for investigative acts which concern parties subject to profes-
sional secrecy who have the right to refuse evidence. Naturally, the particulars of these 
	
		
53  JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMOR ON EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton, revised ed. 1961). 
54  Hunt v. Blackburn 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1988): the privilege “is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and 
administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which 
assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of 
disclosure”; Trammel v. United States 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980): “The lawyer-client privilege rests on the need for 
the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the pro-
fessional mission is to be carried out”. 
55  BVerfG: † Geldwäsche durch Strafverteidiger, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT , 1305, 1307 (2004). 
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privileges in internal investigations are contested.56 The prevalent opinion is that under 
German Employment Law associates are obligated to provide information in the case of 
an “interrogation” by private persons even if they incriminate themselves.57 For members 
of the representative and supervisory boards this duty is derived from Company Law.58 
Despite the conflict between the duty to provide information and the procedural right to 
refrain from self-incriminating testimony (interrogation of an employee suspected of an 
offense), legal practice assumes that the information provided by the employee or execu-
tive is at least indirectly of use.59 Such information may in any case be used to instate in-
vestigative proceedings against the party concerned.60  
 
With regard to the right to refuse evidence and seizure prohibition it is important who 
gave the lawyer (or defense counsel) the retainer. If the retainer is from the company the 
company may release him from the duty of professional secrecy with the consequence 
that the documents can be seized and evaluated when the accused associate objects.61  It 
has not yet been determined if documents such as final reports on the internal investiga-
tion are at least not subject to seizure if the investigations are aimed against the company 
(in connection with the order of forfeiture or imposition of a company fine). Moreover, 
	
		
56  Basics: Matthias Jahn, Ermittlungen in Sachen Siemens/SEC, STRAFVERTEIDIGER, 41 (2009); Carsten Mo-
msen, Internal Investigations zwischen arbeitsrechtlicher Mitwirkungspflicht und strafprozessualer Selbstbelas-
tungsfreiheit, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK, 508 (2001); Christian Pelz, 
Ambiguities in International Internal Investigations, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL 14 (Vol. 2 No. 1 2016), 
retrievable at: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-199152; Folker Bittmann, Internal Investiga-
tions Under German Law, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 74 (Vol. 1 No. 1 2015), retrievable at: 
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-176443; Sascha Süße & Carolin Püschel, Collecting Evi-
dence in Internal Investigations in the Light of Parallel Criminal Proceedings, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOUR-
NAL, 26 (Vol. 2 No. 1 2016), retrievable at: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-199168. 
57  Hans Theile, Die Herausbildung normativer Orientierungsmuster für Internal Investigations –  am Beispiel 
selbstbelastender Aussagen, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK, 378, 378 (2013); 
Martin Lützeler & Patrick Müller-Sartori, Die Befragung des Arbeitnehmers – Auskunftspflicht oder Zeugnis-
verweigerungsrecht? CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT, 19 (2011); cf. also: Burkhard Göpfert & Frank 
Merten & Carolin Siegrist, Mitarbeiter als „Wissensträger”. Ein Beitrag zur aktuellen Compliance-Diskussion, 
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 1703, 1705 (2008).  
58  cf. Folker Bittmann, Internal Investigations Under German Law, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 74, 97 
(Vol. 1 No. 1 2015), retrievable at: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-176443. 
59  Important detail questions discussed in the literature have not yet been the subject matter of court rulings such 
as the question of usability of statements obtained using prohibited interrogation methods within the scope 
of internal investigations, see Matthias Jahn, Ermittlungen in Sachen Siemens/SEC, STRAFVERTEIDIGER, 41 
(2009).  
60  For example the Municipal Court of Hamburg: “ The idea that the authority of the state may not force the 
subjects of the law to self-incrimination through duties of cooperation and information subject to punishment 
upon breach and to use the disclosed information to prosecute him is clearly not applicable to the present case 
in which private persons have entered legal (employment) relationships which may force them to disclose crim-
inal behavior”, Margarete Gräfin v. Galen, LG Hamburg: Beschlagnahme von Interviewprotokollen nach „In-
ternal Investigations” – HSH Nordbank, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 942, 944 (2011); in contrast 
Hans Theile, Internal Investigations« und Selbstbelastung, STRAFVERTEIDIGER, 381, 384 ff. (2011);  also Luís 
Greco & Christian Caracas, Internal investigations und Selbstbelastungsfreiheit, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
STRAFRECHT, 7, 8 ff. (2015). 
61  cf. Folker Bittmann, Internal Investigations Under German Law, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 74, 97 
(Vol. 1 No. 1 2015), retrievable at: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-176443. 
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it is unclear when the protection starts to take effect, i.e. when a protected defense rela-
tionship starts. 62 Hence, in conclusion it must be stated that already in the group of law-
yers and defense counsels who have a right to refuse evidence, protection of the procured 
facts against the encroachment of the investigation authorities is only patchy. The testudo 
strategy only works partially: German Criminal Procedural Law only equips the legion-
naires with the round shield (parma), not with the rectangular shield (scutum). 
 
Protection through the said procedural privileges fails entirely where the parties in ques-
tion are not subject to professional secrecy, but belong to the company (Compliance Of-
ficer, associates/Head of Internal Auditing, Corporate Lawyer or an employee of a com-
pany specialized in conducting internal investigations (forensic services). According to the 
legal situation since Jan. 1, 2016 (Act on the Reorganization of Corporate Lawyers Law63) 
this has now also been settled for corporate lawyers. Pursuant to § 53 Sect. 1 Nr. 3 StPO 
they are explicitly exempt from the right to refuse evidence and the procedural guarantees 
securing this.64 The ratio decidendi for this restriction are Criminal Law policy motives. 
“The ratio decidendi for the restriction of legal privileges is the need for effective criminal 
prosecution. Inclusion of the corporate lawyers and corporate patent lawyers under the 
scope of application of §§ 97 and 160a StPO would harbor the risk that relevant evidence 
would not be available to the investigation authorities.”  The legislator is following the 
precedent set by the European Supreme Court in the well-known Akzo/Nobel case.65  
Here, denial of protection of the confidentiality of communication was rejected with the 
argument that due to his economic dependence on the employer the corporate lawyer 
does not have the same freedom as the external lawyer. The consequences of the exclusion 
of corporate lawyers from legal privileges in practice are radical: An associate who discloses 
information to a corporate lawyer (often the corporate lawyer and Head of Compliance 
are the same person) cannot rely on confidentiality. The corporate lawyer may be inter-
rogated as a witness, his documents are subject to seizure.  
The case is entirely different in the US. There it has been initially acknowledged as the 
	
		
62  According to the Municipal Court of Gießen, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUESTRAFRECHT, 
409, 409 f. (2012), the seizure prohibition set out in § 97 Sect. 1 Nr. 1 StPO “also applies to defense documents 
prepared for the formal instatement of investigation proceedings”, for more details see: Stefan Rütters & Anne 
Schneider, Die Beschlagnahme anwaltlicher Unterlagen im Unternehmensgewahrsam, GOLTDAMMER'S AR-
CHIV FÜR STRAFRECHT, 160 (2014). 
63  BT Drucks. 18/5201 
64  Regarding the legal situation prior to Jan. 1, 2016, cf. Winfried Hassemer, Das Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht des 
Syndikusanwalts, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERSTRAFRECHT, 1 (1986), Claus Roxin, Das 
Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht des Syndikusanwalts, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 1129 (1992), Claus Ro-
xin, Das Beschlagnahmeprivileg des Syndikusanwalts im Lichte der neuesten Rechtsentwicklung, NEUE JURIS-
TISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 17 (1995) and Konrad Redeker, Der Syndikusanwalt als Rechtsanwalt, NEUE JU-
RISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 889 (2004). 
65  EuGH, (European Supreme Court) ruling of Sept. 14, 2010, C-550/07. P. Hustus,  rightly points out that this 
ruling only concerned the European anti-trust proceedings and was not necessarily capable of being extrapo-
lated to the StPO, Ludmila Hustus, Der Syndikusanwalt und das Legal Privilege respektive das Anwaltsprivi-
leg – alea iacta est, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT, 65 (2016); detailed reconstruction of the ruling and 
the underlying facts of the case in: Lucian E. Dervan, International White Collar Crime and the Globalization 
of internal Investigations, FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL, 361, 369 ff. (2011). 
	
	
COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 3   NUMBER 1   2017 
HENDRIK SCHNEIDER | THE ENTERPRISE IN TESTUDO FORMATION 
 
PAGE  56 
flipside of Corporate Criminal Law since the Upjohn ruling by the Supreme Court in 
198166 that legal privilege does not only apply to natural, but also to legal entities: 
 
“Admittedly complications in the application of the privilege arise when the client is a 
corporation, which, in theory, is an artificial creature of the law, and not an individual; 
but this Court has assumed that the privilege applies when the client is a corporation.”67 
From this point on, it is now a foregone conclusion that attorney-client privilege applies 
to the corporation,“68 
 
and that there is no difference between an in-house counsel and external lawyer or defense 
counsel69.  The arguments that the corporate lawyer70 is economically dependent and 
subject to the duty to follow his employer’s instructions have been deemed untenable for 
justifying a distinction between the two professional groups: “[t]hese are not sufficient 
differences to distinguish the two types of counsel for purposes of the attorney-client priv-
ilege.” 71 Therefore, attorney-client privilege technically applies equally to in-house and 
external counsel, as the “lawyer’s status as in-house counsel ‘does not dilute the privilege.” 
72 
 
Within the context of the emergence of internal investigations it was then contested how-
ever, who the attorney’s client is and accordingly who can decide on the exercise and grant 
of the privilege. According to the “Control Group Test” the status of the associate dis-
closing information to the internal or external lawyer is decisive. 73According to this, the 
privilege applies to the extent that the associate can implement legal counsel provided on 
	
		
66  In detail: John E. Sexton, A Post-UPJOHN consideration of the corporate attorney-client privilege, NEW YORK 
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 443 (1982); cf. also Gerald F. Luttkus, Implications of Upjohn Symposium: The 
Role of Professionals in Corporate Governance: Note, 57, NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW, 887 (1981); Lucian E. 
Dervan, Internal Investigations and the Evolving Fate of Privilege, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 3, 5 
(Vol. 2 No. 1 2016), retrievable at: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-199145. 
67		 Upjohn Co. v. United States 449 U.S. 389-390 (1981).	
68  CFTC v. Weintraub 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985): “It is by now well established, and undisputed by the parties to 
this case, that the attorney-client privilege attaches to corporations as well as to individuals.” 
69  Grace G. Giesel, Upjohn Warnings, the Attorney-Client Privilege, and Principles of Lawyer Ethics: Achieving 
Harmony, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW, 109, 140 (2010), the article refers to rulings by district courts 
in which even non-lawyers are subject to the protection of privilege; for the distinction between Inhouse Coun-
sel and external lawyer or defense council with the example of the Bank of China case see also Lucian E. Dervan, 
Internal Investigations and the Evolving Fate of Privilege, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 3, 10 (Vol. 2 No. 
1 2016), retrievable at: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-199145. 
70  United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 89 F.Supp 357, 358-359 (D. Mass.1950). 
71  United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 89 F.Supp 357, 358-359 (D. Mass.1950). 
72  In re Kellogg Brown and Root, 756 F.3d; cf. also Lucian E. Dervan, Internal Investigations and the Evolving 
Fate of Privilege, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 3, 6 (Vol. 2 No. 1 2016), retrievable at: http://nbn-resolv-
ing.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-199145; Michele DeStefano describes the difference between the in-house 
counsel and the compliance professional: Michele DeStefano, The Chief Compliance Officer - Should there be 
a new “C” in the C-Suite?, THE PRACTICE (July 2016), retrievable at: https://thepractice.law.harvard.edu/ar-
ticle/the-chief-compliance-officer/. 
73  City of Philadelphia vs. Westinghouse Electric. Crop, 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962) 
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the basis of his representation of the facts of the case as a business decision. From a differ-
ent standpoint, the subject matter of the associate’s statement is decisive (“Subject Matter 
Test” 74). Where communication takes places at the instruction of a body of the company 
looking for legal counsel for the company and the associate’s statement refers to his duties 
under Employment Law, the privilege applies. 
 
The difference between the two approaches lies primarily in the question of the involve-
ment of associates from lower hierarchy levels in the privilege’s scope of protection. The 
lowest common denominator can be found in the distinction between business and legal 
advice. Privilege only exists where legal counsel, but not merely business advice is being 
sought75.  In more recent case law on the issue of the distinction between business and 
legal advice the “but for” is partially relied on76.  According to this it must be proven that 
the communication has the purpose of obtaining legal counsel: “the communication 
would not have been made ‘but for’ the fact that legal advice was sought.”77 Only in this 
case does the privilege apply. According to the other standpoint it is merely necessary that 
legal advice be obtained, among other things. 78 A final ruling by the Supreme Court on 
this issue is still pending. 
 
In the Upjohn ruling by the Supreme Court the Control Group approach is abandoned 
as a distinction criterion for the extent of protection of the privilege. The status of the 
employee is not decisive, as valuable information may be provided by associates at all hi-
erarchy levels who are thus worthy of protection. Where protection of confidentiality is 
denied there is a risk that interrogation of employees outside of the Control Group will 
be refrained from on procedural grounds in the investigation. This is incompatible with 
the nature and purpose of the attorney-client privilege and its fundamental significance 
for legal proceedings based on the principles of the rule of law. 79  The Supreme Court 
	
		
74  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-492 (7th Cir. 1970), confirmed by 400 U.S. 348 
(1971). 
75  Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 605 (8th Cir. 1978). The distinction between Business 
and Legal Advice needs a thorough examination. In particular in the case of corporate lawyers it is not clear 
that legal advice is being sought: Grace M. Giesel, The Legal Advice Requirement of the Attorney-Client Priv-
ilege: A Special Problem for In-House Counsel and Outside Attorneys representing Corporations, MERCER 
LAW REVIEW, 1169 (1997); Michele DeStefano, The Chief Compliance Officer - Should there be a new “C” in 
the C-Suite?, THE PRACTICE (July 2016), retrievable at: https://thepractice.law.harvard.edu/article/the-chief-
compliance-officer/.  
76  In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
77  United. States ex rel. Barko v. Halliburton Co. No. 05-cv-1276, 2014. WL 1016784 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2014). 
78  In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
79  The significance of the privilege is highlighted as follows: “The attorney–client privilege is the oldest of the 
privileges for confidential communications known to the common law. Its purpose is to encourage full and 
frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the 
observance of law and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy 
serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the 
client.” cf. Upjohn Co. v. United States 449 U.S. 389 (1981). 
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then makes it clear that in the case where internal investigations are ordered for the pur-
pose of providing legal counsel, the sole client is the company. According to this, only the 
company bodies can release parties from the duty of confidentiality. According to the Su-
preme Court this can lead to misunderstandings in the interrogation of the associates. 
Accordingly, a caveat is necessary following the ruling by the Supreme Court (Upjohn 
warning) comprising the following elements and the disregard of which can entail an ev-
idence evaluation prohibition: 80 
 
“the attorney represents the corporation and not the individual employee; the interview 
is covered by the attorney-client privilege, which belongs to and is controlled by the cor-
poration, not the individual employee; the corporation may decide, in its sole discretion, 
whether to waive the privilege and disclose information from the interview to third par-
ties, including the government.” 81 
 
Thus the two jurisdictions, Germany and the US arrive at different results when deter-
mining the extent of legal privilege. In the US there is extensive protection of communi-
cation within the scope of the internal investigation without taking into consideration 
whether the investigation is being performed by a corporate lawyer or an external lawyer. 
This consolidates the position of the company. As the master over the privilege the com-
pany can decide whether and to what extent it releases its legal counsel from the duty of 
secrecy and discloses information on corporate misconduct. The US works with the car-
rot, Germany with the stick. If the company cooperates with the investigation authorities 
in the US and discloses all information obtained without reservations, the sentence will 
be lighter in accordance with the sentencing guidelines82. In Germany it is unclear if co-
operation is rewarded as the efforts in the Compliance sector do not necessarily extend to 
company fines or the forfeiture order83. Where there is no cooperation and open commu-
nication with the prosecuting attorney the investigation authorities will use coercive 
	
		
80  U.S. v. Nicholas 606 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1112 (C.D. Cal.); lifted on other grounds: United States v. Ruehle 583 
F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2009); but cf.: In Re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2005). 
81  Lucian E. Dervan, International White Collar Crime and the Globalization of internal Investigations, FORD-
HAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL, 361, 379 f. (2011). 
82  A points system is used for determining the severity of the sentence which is reduced by 2 to 5 points depending 
on the extent of the company’s cooperation. Chapter 8 Section   (g) “Self-Reporting, Cooperation and Ac-
ceptance of Responsibility” of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines states: “(1) If the organization (A) prior to an 
imminent threat of disclosure or government investigation; and (B) within a reasonably prompt time after 
becoming aware of the offense, reported the offense to appropriate governmental authorities, fully cooperated 
in the investigation, and clearly demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its 
criminal conduct, subtract 5 points; or (2) If the organization fully cooperated in the investigation and clearly 
demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct, subtract 2 
points; ...” [bold type by the author], retrievable at: http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines-manual/2011/2011-8c25. 
83  Convenient overview at: Imme Roxin, Probleme und Strategien der Compliance-Begleitung in Unternehmen, 
STRAFVERTEIDIGER, 116, 117 f. (2012); regarding cooperation cf. Sascha Süße & Carolin Püschel, Collecting 
Evidence in Internal Investigations in the Light of Parallel Criminal Proceedings, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE 
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measures in the investigation proceedings and procure the necessary information.  As ex-
pounded above, this is justified primarily with a Criminal Law policy argument. No 
strong defense positions and privileges may be conceded to the strong company, or else 
the investigation will come to naught. 
 
C. Expedient Corrections 
 
According to the stance taken here the legislative ruling to exclude corporate lawyers from 
legal privilege if they work as a lawyer for the company is inconsistent and dubious from 
the aspect of Criminal Law policy. 84  It therefore behooves correction de lege lata through 
a teleological reduction of § 53 Sect. 1 Nr. 3 StPO. De lege ferenda  cancellation of the 
restriction set out in § 53 Sect. 1 Nr. 3 StPO  and thus a partial equalization of the legal 
situation in German with that in the US is advisable. In contrast, the ruling by the Ger-
man legislator to exclude other company lawyers from legal privilege is accurate. How-
ever, the extent of privilege to legal professionals not admitted to the bar in accordance 
with the legal situation in the US is alien to the system, at least according to the legal un-
derstanding here.   
 
§ 53 StPO and the privileges of the defense counsel and lawyers securing it have the pri-
mary purpose of protecting the relationship of trust between the person of trust and the 
party obtaining legal advice. As already expounded, the attorney/defense counsel privi-
lege also protects the public interest in criminal justice administration based on the rule 
of law and procedural equality and intends to ensure that parties seeking counsel are not 
hindered from providing complete information to the person of trust because they fear 
that he has to disclose the entrusted information. 85   Moreover, the party subject to pro-
fessional secrecy is also to be protected from the coercive situation of keeping confidenti-
ality with regard to the client in conflict with cooperation in the investigation86. 
 
The reorganization of the law concerning corporate lawyers recognizes that the corporate 
lawyer provides legal counsel to his employer and rightly identifies this as the work of a 
lawyer. Accordingly, the legislator declares the aspect of the lack of economic independ-
ence of the corporate lawyer, formerly decisive for denial of legal privilege, as irrelevant 
	
		
84  Regarding the extension of legal privilege to the corporate lawyers, cf. already Christian Burholt, Ein Schritt 
vor, zwei zurück – Gilt das Anwaltsprivileg im europäischen kartellrecht auch für Syndikusanwälte?, 3, BUN-
DESRECHTSANWALTSKAMMER-MITTEILUNG, 100, 102 (2004). 
85  Spaulding stresses this using a metaphor from the healthcare sector: “the patient cannot hope to receive ade-
quate treatment without revealing her symptoms, she is obliged to be full and frank in order to receive effective 
service“, Norman W. Spaulding, Compliance, Creative Deviance, and Resistance to Law: A Theory of the At-
torney-Client Privilege, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL OF THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER, 135, 159 
(2013). 
86  Lothar Senge, in Karlsruher Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung, § 53 StPO No. 1 (: Rolf Hannich 7th ed. 
2013); GERD PFEIFFER, STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG, § 53 StPO, No. 1 (5th ed. 2005); ROBERT MAGNUS, DAS 
ANWALTSPRIVILEG UND SEIN ZIVILPROZESSUALER SCHUTZ, 22 ff., 30 ff. (2010); Ludmila Hustus, Der Syn-
dikusanwalt und das Legal Privilege respektive das Anwaltsprivileg – alea iacta est, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
STRAFRECHT, 65, 70f. (2016). 
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and applies the distinction between business and legal advice customary in Anglo-Saxon 
legal systems, as can be concluded from the legal definition of the functions of a lawyer. 
Because (with the exception of § 46 Sect. 3 Nr. 3, 4 BRAO) only “the examination of legal 
issues including solving of the case as well as elaborating and evaluating potential solu-
tions and providing legal advice” is counted among the professionally independent and 
autonomous functions which are a constituent element of the work of a lawyer and thus 
not provision of exclusively economic advice to the company.  It would be logical to allow 
the right to refuse evidence according to §53 StPO including the privileges secured by it 
for provision of legal advice on Criminal Law, which likewise can fall under the definition 
of lawyer’s work in the same way as for external lawyers87.  Because the initial situation is 
identical in this regard: The corporate lawyer providing legal counsel commands trust, is 
dependent on complete communication of the facts of the case in order to provide legal 
advice and requires protection himself from the conflict of interests depicted above. US 
Criminal Law, normally regarded as being “on top of it”, recognizes this whereas the Ger-
man legislator apparently does not.  
 
If the similar initial situation of external lawyers and of corporate lawyers as presented is 
to be accounted for, there are two different solution approaches. It is at first expedient to 
interpret the restriction in the scope of application of the right to refuse evidence as a 
procedural securing of the prohibited action in § 46c Sect. 2 BRAO. According to this 
corporate lawyers “in penalty or fine proceedings against the employer or his associates” 
“may not act as their defense or representative, this applies where the subject matter of 
the penalty or fine proceedings is a company-related offense accusation, also with regard 
to work as a lawyer as defined by § 4.” Accordingly, § 53 Sect. 1 Nr. 3 StPO can be inter-
preted to the effect that the restriction of the right to refuse evidence only applies where 
the corporate lawyer acts in breach of § 46c BRAO but not when he merely provides legal 
advice internally to the employer with regard to facts relevant to a case in Criminal Law 
which he is solving.  
 
The other possibility of securing the relationship of trust consists in recourse to § 53a 
StPO. If the term paraprofessional is interpreted broadly, which cannot be excluded from 
the wording of § 53a StPO, 88 the corporate lawyer can also be included under this provi-
sion which in accordance with § 53 Sect. 1 Nr. 3 StPO does not explicitly remain unaf-
fected. 89   In this way the important coordinating work of the corporate lawyer in the case 
of management of the internal investigations by an external party subject to professional 
	
		
87  Also agreed on by Winfried Hassemer, Das Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht des Syndikusanwalts, ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERSTRAFRECHT, 1 (1986); Claus Roxin, Das Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht des 
Syndikusanwalts, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 1129 (1992); Konrad Redeker, Der Syndikusanwalt 
als Rechtsanwalt, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 889 (2004) on the legal situation prior to the Act on 
the Reorganization of the Law on Corporate Lawyers 2016. 
88  Lothar Senge, in Karlsruher Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung, §53a StPO No. 2 (Rolf Hannich 5th ed. 
2013); GERD PFEIFFER, STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG, §53a StPO No. 1 (5th ed. 2005); TIDO PARK, DURCHSU-
CHUNG UND BESCHLAGNAHME, No. 547 (3rd ed. 2015). 
89  BT-Drs. 18/5201, 40. 
	
	
COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 3   NUMBER 1   2017 
HENDRIK SCHNEIDER | THE ENTERPRISE IN TESTUDO FORMATION 
 
PAGE  61 
secrecy would be protected, reinforcing the testudo formation in this empirically relevant 
area. There is no reason today for the general weakening of his position in relation to the 
external lawyer on grounds of economic policy.  The recourse to corporate lawyers may 
have made sense in the First World War era by sustainably keeping freelance lawyers away 
from corporate clients90 – but nowadays this context is certainly not verifiable. 
 
The restriction set out in § 53 Sect. 1 Nr. 3 StPO advocated here to correct the depicted 
inconsistency is also not pertinent from the aspect of Criminal Law policy. Forced disclo-
sure of information and the confiscation of documents will entail tactical circumventive 
maneuvers which make it more difficult instead of easier to ascertain the facts of the case. 
Informed companies will resort to external counsel from the start or take other measures 
to foil access to the relevant documents. This undermines the cooperative approach which 
the investigation authorities depend on not least due to their limited resources and limits 
prevention because the corporate lawyer, who may act as the “legal conscience” 91 of a 
company is excluded on procedural grounds in the case of suspicion and consequently 
cannot draw any conclusions for improvement of the Compliance Management system 
from the case. For this reason, in awareness of the legal situation in Germany it is even 
advised in the US to reduce the number of personnel in the Legal Department of the 
company and to rely exclusively on consulting by external lawyers. 92 
 
However, the present plea for assumption of the American Way93 does not extend to in-
cluding the company lawyer who is not admitted to the bar or is admitted as a corporate 
lawyer according to the new legislation (§ 46a BRAO) under the protection of § 53 StPO. 
De lege lata there is no dogmatic leeway. Even de lege ferenda the differences between the 
corporate lawyer not admitted to the bar and the corporate lawyer admitted to the bar are 
factors in favor of the current procedural distinction. The corporate lawyer not admitted 
to the bar may also provide legal advice. But it depends on the individual case to what 
extent he provides the advice independently. Professional independence is the key to trust 
in legal advice that is worthy of protection and thus a constituent element for application 
of legal privilege. 
	
		
90  Claus Roxin, Das Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht des Syndikusanwalts, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 
1129, 1131 (1992). 
91  cf. the well-known case of the Compliance Officer ruling by the German Supreme Court (BGHSt 54, 44 ff.), 
in detail: Hendrik Schneider & Peter Gottschaldt, Offene Grundsatzfragen der strafrechtlichen Verantwort-
lichkeit von Compliance-Beauftragten in Unternehmen, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE STRAF-
RECHTSDOGMATIK, 573 (2011). 
92  Andrew R. Nash, In-House but out in the Cold: A Comparison of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the United 
States and European Union, ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL, 453, 492 (2012); with reference to the Akzo Nobel 
ruling by the: “For corporations operating on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, there appears little value in 
maintaining large in-house legal departments in any European offices”. 
93  The extent of legal privilege in US law is naturally not uncontested, cf. the summary of the arguments “against 
confidentiality” on the basis of an economic analysis of the law (without reference to internal investigations) 
in Dru Stevenson, Against Confidentiality, UC DAVIS LAW REVIEW, 337, 403 (2014): “The rules undermine 
the other ethical rules that call for candor, integrity, and fairness; they undermine public confidence in the legal 
system; and they undermine transparency trust in general through lemons effects”. 
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The imponderables of current Criminal Business Law create a demand for legal advice 
which should be subject to clear procedural rules and competences. Analysis of the legal 
framework conditions for internal investigations has proven that currently this is not the 
case. The legal situation in Germany is already not transparent, partly inconsistent and 
diversified. This is especially true of national procedures and the corresponding Cross-
Border Internal Investigations in which even lawyers’ professional duty of secrecy can 
conflict with the duty to disclose information under Criminal Law.94 Criminal Business 
Law already acts as an obstacle to growth95 nowadays, as economic decisions first need to 
be secured through Compliance and Legal, a cumbersome process. The flipside of this 
development is at least the securing of trust in the lawyers providing advice, internal as 
well as external. Companies need a safe harbor to navigate these waters. The present ap-
proach which stabilizes the tactics of the testudo at least in one detailed area and represents 
a certain counterweight to the encroaching risk of companies from unpredictable Crimi-
nal Business Law serves this purpose. 
	
		
94  Concise presentation of the most important legal issues in Christian Pelz, Ambiguities in International Inter-
nal Investigations, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 14 (Vol. 2 No. 1 2016). 
95  Hendrik Schneider, Wachstumsbremse Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, 1, NEUE KRIMINALPOLITIK, 30 (2012). 
